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Abstract
The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) Task Force on Carbon Geologic Storage (CGS) has produced 
reports that constitute IOGCC guidance to U.S. states and Canadian provinces on the formation of legal and regulatory 
frameworks for the storage of carbon dioxide (CO) in non-hydrocarbon-bearing geologic formations. This paper describes the
latest effort of the Task Force focused on issues of liability in all phases of a CGS project and discusses liability broadly under 
federal, state or provincial, and common law from the perspective of the state or provincial regulator. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) is a multistate government agency that promotes the 
conservation and efficient recovery of domestic oil and natural gas resources while protecting health, safety, and the 
environment. IOGCC advocates for environmentally sound ways to increase the supply of energy. This is 
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accomplished by providing governors of member states with a clear and unified voice to Congress while also serving 
as the authority on issues surrounding these vital resources.
IOGCC also assists states in balancing a multitude of interests through sound regulatory practices. Its unique 
structure offers a highly effective forum for states, industry, Congress, and the environmental community to share 
information and viewpoints to advance our nation’s energy future. It stands dedicated to securing resources needed 
to ensure the nation’s energy, economic, and national security. 
2. Background
The IOGCC Carbon Capture and Geologic Storage Task Force (Task Force) has been addressing legal and 
regulatory issues surrounding the capture and storage of anthropogenic sources of carbon dioxide (CO2) since its 
inception in 2002. Its membership has included IOGCC member states and international affiliates, state and 
provincial oil and gas agencies, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), DOE-sponsored Regional Carbon 
Sequestration Partnerships (RCSPs), the Association of American State Geologists (AASG), nongovernment 
organizations, and the oil and natural gas industry.
The IOGCC Task Force on Carbon Geologic Storage (CGS) has produced reports in each of the three phases of 
DOE’s RCSP Program. Taken together, all of the reports in 2005, 2007, 2010, and now 2014 constitute IOGCC 
guidance to U.S. states and Canadian provinces on the formation of legal and regulatory frameworks for the storage 
of CO2 in non-hydrocarbon-bearing geologic formations. 
The most recent effort of the Task Force, upon which this paper is based, focuses on issues of liability in all of the 
phases of a CGS project related to CGS in non-hydrocarbon-bearing formations. It does not, except cursorily, 
address CGS in the context of enhanced oil recovery (EOR).
The Task Force reviewed liability broadly under federal, state or provincial, and common law from the 
perspective of the state or provincial regulator of CGS. The most relevant of these liability concerns are likely to be 
those liabilities that arise out of the state or provincial and, in the United States, federal laws that deal directly with 
CGS.
Since the last IOGCC guidance in 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated 
regulations (Class VI) under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and its Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
Program [1] to govern CGS. The new EPA regulations address many but not all aspects of CGS project.
3. Federal, state, and provincial jurisdictions
To better illustrate the divisions in federal/state regulation and jurisdiction within a CGS project, the Task Force 
did two things. First, it posited a CGS project as being comprised of five phases: I) Exploratory, II) Permitting (Pre-
Storage), III) Storage (Operational), IV) Closure, and V) Post-Closure. Five phases rather than the four identified in 
previous IOGCC Task Force guidance better capture the limited federal jurisdiction under SDWA. Second, the Task 
Force produced a CGS Project Framework and Risk Analysis. The analysis, by activity over the five phases of a 
CGS project, identifies the risks posed by each activity, the regulatory jurisdiction (federal or state) over the activity, 
and the recommended Financial Assurance (FA) to cover the regulatory risks of the activity. The Task Force 
evaluated FA and the various mechanisms available to the states/provinces to protect their interests related to a CGS 
project.
The Task Force concluded that in the United States, states must play a role in the regulation of CGS. EPA 
jurisdiction does not cover all of the state’s regulatory interests in a CGS project. The EPA regulatory mandate under 
SDWA begins and ends with the protection of underground sources of drinking water (USDW). However, state 
interests extend well beyond this important but limited mandate. Those state interests include protecting the state 
from associated liability from what would otherwise be nonregulated CGS-related activity under the UIC Class VI 
Rule. 
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Fig 1. CGS project flow diagram (boxes show concurrent state and UIC Class VI jurisdiction in Phases II, III, and IV. Phase I and V show 
exclusive state jurisdiction).
Prime examples of these include all of the CGS Phase I (Exploratory) and Phase V (Post-Closure) activities, as 
well as activity involving surface facilities, including pipelines, in Phases II, III, and IV of a CGS project. None of 
these are regulated by EPA jurisdiction under SDWA. 
In addition to the recommendation that states play a regulatory role alongside EPA in regulation of CGS, the Task 
Force encourages states to secure Class VI primacy jurisdiction from EPA. By securing Class VI primacy, a state 
concurrently will exercise both its regulatory jurisdiction and the federal SDWA regulatory jurisdiction (SDWA 
allows a state to be granted primacy if it meets certain conditions set forth in the act).
The situation in Canada with regard to CGS development is quite different as CGS almost entirely is regulated at 
the provincial level. Except in a few instances, such as if a project is receiving federal funding, which would trigger 
a federal environmental impact assessment (EIA) in addition to a potential provincial EIA, there is minimal overlap 
between federal–provincial regulatory jurisdiction.
Given the regulatory complexities of CO2 storage dealing with property rights, pore space management, and 
environmental protection issues, the Task Force strongly recommends that states and provinces regulate CO2 storage 
utilizing a resource management philosophy, first introduced by the Task Force in conjunction with its 2007 
Guidance [2]. A resource management philosophy allows these issues to be regulated in a way that balances these 
activities within an all-encompassing regulatory framework. Waste management frameworks do not adequately 
address pore space ownership and consequently cannot effectively manage the efficient use of the pore space 
resource.
The Task Force concluded that in order to facilitate the orderly development of CO2 storage projects within state 
and provincial boundaries that a state or province should embrace two basic principles enumerated in previous Task 
Force efforts. 
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These principles are 1) that it is in the public interest to promote the geologic storage of CO2 in order to reduce 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions and 2) that the pore space of the state or province should be regulated and managed as 
a resource under a resource management framework. This should be done by the state or province prior to storage 
occurring within the state or province.
These principles will allow for the exercise of state and provincial authority so as to facilitate and regulate CGS 
projects within the state or provincial borders. 
As to the first principle above, a declaration that CO2 storage is in the public interest is important to enable the 
state or province to utilize its powers of eminent domain, or similar authorities, so as to amalgamate the necessary 
property rights.
With respect to the second principle, given that usable pore space is the major component of CGS storage and is a 
finite resource within the state or province, it is in the interest of the state or province to manage this pore space 
resource so as to maximize the amount of CO2 or some other future resource that can be stored. In this regard, there 
is one additional factor related to pore space management of which states need to be aware. 
4. Class II to Class VI transition
When the UIC Class VI Rule was promulgated in December 2010, among the provisions of the Rule that were not 
contained in the UIC Class VI Proposed Rule [3], and therefore not anticipated by the Task Force and others, was a 
regulatory provision concerning the potential for conversion of a well from UIC Class II to Class VI.
The UIC Class VI Proposed Rule [3] had stated that “Class VI requirements only would apply to injection wells 
specifically permitted for the purpose of [geologic sequestration]. Injection of CO2 for the purposes of [EOR], as 
long as any production is occurring, will continue to be permitted under the Class II program” [3].
The UIC Class VI Rule specifically contains language bringing into question the continued regulation under 
Class II of CO2 EOR (as of the date of this publication, to the best of the Task Force’s knowledge, no Class II to 
Class VI transition has occurred). Left in its place was language authorizing EPA, in states where Class VI primacy 
has not been granted to the state, to require a permit for transition from Class II to Class VI when the regional 
administrator finds that there is an increased risk to USDWs as compared to traditional EOR operations using CO2
[1].
The subject matter of the current effort of the Task Force is primarily focused on the issue of liability in the 
storage of CO2 in non-hydrocarbon-bearing formations. However, regarding this development, the Task Force notes
the potentially serious economic and practical implications for the United States, and particularly its CO2 EOR 
industry. 
It is the opinion of the Task Force that the distinct and likely consequence of such a transition requirement could 
be the impairment of currently active CO2 EOR storage, due to widespread concerns in the EOR industry regarding 
the feasibility of complying with Class VI and regulatory risks associated with the uncertainty of compelled well 
conversion.
Likewise, operators of proposed EOR projects share the same concerns dealing with increased project costs.
These concerns are notable for states with an active or prospective CO2 EOR industry. Such states may wish to 
consider whether to adopt laws and regulations along the lines of the model documents contained in the Task Force 
2010 guidance [4] and secure primacy under Class VI so the state has appropriate involvement in program 
implementation with respect to potential transition.
In addition, to the extent forced transition from Class II to VI impedes CO2 EOR development, the requirement 
also is likely to conflict with state conservation principles that require that states maximize the economic recovery of 
their hydrocarbon resource.
New legal issues are likely to arise and be complex in a transition from Class II to Class VI. Class II is an 
established regulatory regime with an established implementation history and legal framework. Class VI is new and 
untested. 
For instance, an EOR owner or operator required to transition operations under Class VI could face a host of new 
and unanticipated potential liabilities and expenses related to pore space ownership for storage.
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5. Liability in the context of CGS
The Task Force focused on liability and the potential risks associated with CGS operations. An important starting 
point is, therefore, a discussion of what the Task Force means by liability.
As with any industrial activity, liability for CGS operations will arise in one of two ways: 1) violation of laws 
enacted by a government—federal or state/province or 2) under common law theory, such as negligence, trespass, or 
nuisance. The Task Force identified and discussed potential pathways of liability for CGS in three categories: federal 
statutes, state and provincial statutes, and common law.
For explanatory purposes, it also may be useful to think of potential liabilities in terms of these types: 1) liabilities 
for cleaning up after an incident, which would include both the cost of fixing the facility so future incidents do not 
occur and the cost of remediating environmental damage that may occur, such as groundwater contamination; 
2) penalties imposed by the government; and 3) liabilities to neighbors and others for property damage or other 
injuries.
From the perspective of the state or provincial regulator of CGS, the foremost “liability” concerns will be with 
those liabilities that arise out of the state/provincial and, in the United States, federal laws that deal directly with 
CGS, most notably SDWA and state laws. This includes the regulations promulgated by a state, province, or federal 
government under those laws and the permits and approvals issued. Playing an important role in this is “financial 
assurance” (FA), a regulatory requirement that assures that financial resources are available to the regulator should 
the CGS project operator fail to carry out a regulatory obligation. 
The Task Force identified and discussed the common FA mechanisms used to handle these liabilities and 
identified the risks inherent in the various activities that would be undertaken by a CGS project operator in each of 
the identified five phases of a CGS project. Some of those risks, but not all, will be covered by FA. 
To the extent the identified risks are of a nature appropriate for FA—for example most environmental risks — the 
Task Force identified those FA mechanisms that it regards as most appropriate for the particular risk so as to cover 
the liabilities that would ensue from that risk event should the operator fail to remedy the problem in a timely 
manner on its own.
Although the state and provincial focus will be on the above, it is important that states and provinces 
administering a CGS regulatory regime also understand how their state or provincial CGS-specific laws and 
regulations fit into the broader liability framework. The Task Force discussed in some detail a number of enacted 
laws and common law theories that may have relevance to CGS operations. In the United States, these include 
SDWA, which has become the linchpin for all federal and state CGS regulation in the United States, the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA, or Superfund), and the Clean Air Act (CAA). States typically also have laws that track each of the 
laws above and may add additional requirements. There may be other applicable state laws as well. At common law 
in the United States and Canada, there is the potential for trespass (should a CGS facility operator wrongfully 
interfere with a property owner’s possessory rights and the interference causes damage, the operator may be liable 
for trespass), nuisance (should a CGS facility operator substantially interfere with a property owner’s use or 
enjoyment of their property, the operator may be liable for nuisance), negligence (CGS facility operator will owe a 
duty of care to neighbors and others to operate the facility in a manner not likely to cause property damage or other 
injuries), and strict liability (it is possible that a court could find a CGS facility operator liable for damages to 
property or other injuries, even if the operator was neither at fault or negligent). The Task Force also discussed
Canadian federal statutes.
6. Caretaking and post-closure responsibility
The Task Force recommends, as it did in 2007 and 2010, that states and provinces are best situated to assume 
responsibility for the “caretaking” (monitoring and maintenance) responsibility in the final Post-Closure (Long-Term 
Storage) Phase of a CGS project when that project has been deemed to have stabilized.
In addition, it is recommending that these long-term state and provincial responsibilities be financed by an 
industry-funded and state/province-administered trust fund financed by a tax or fee on each ton of CO2 injected for 
storage along the lines set forth in 2007 and 2010 IOGCC Model CGS Statute (The Model Statute also detailed the 
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“caretaking” activities covered by the trust fund). This is important because, at least in the United States under 
SDWA, EPA is unable to release the operator from federal liability in the Post-Closure Phase of CGS project.
Noting that perpetual federal liability has been cited as a threat to the viability of a CGS industry in the United 
States, the Task Force suggested two general responses, one state, the other federal.
Expressed in its broadest form, under the state response the state would, after issuance of the Certificate of 
Closure, assume complete responsibility for the CGS storage site. The state concurrently also would assume near-
complete liability from the operator under federal and state law, to be financed by a Long-Term State Trust Fund 
that would be funded by an appropriately greater tax or fee on each ton of CO2 injected. This “remediation trust 
fund” could be the same as or distinct from the trust fund. The Task Force recommends it be established to address 
long-term site care (monitoring and maintenance). This option and the breadth of its potential exercise by a state 
would be totally within the control of the state.
The federal response could take a myriad of forms. At its broadest, the federal response could involve amending 
existing federal environmental legislation, including SDWA, to authorize transfer of liability when a site is deemed 
to no longer pose a potential environmental risk. Variations of a federal response also could include a federal trust 
fund, to which post-closure liability could be transferred, or other public–private sector options for the Post-Closure 
Phase of a CGS project.
While the Task Force was unable to go beyond its recommendation of 2007 and 2010 concerning the Long-Term 
Trust Fund and its focus on monitoring and maintenance, it sees merit to a state actively considering the assumption 
of broader responsibility and liability in the Post-Closure Phase.
7. Conclusion
As it stands, there is a relative dearth of commercial projects for active CGS development in the United States 
due, in part, to the fact that the business case for CGS does not yet exist and a rigorous regulatory environment has 
discouraged early adoption of the technology.
No doubt the issue of long-term liability is another important factor. One conclusion that appears clear is that 
states that are willing to adopt legal and regulatory frameworks along the lines suggested in the state solution
described above likely will have an advantage when it comes to securing CGS project development in their 
jurisdictions.
More detailed information on the Task Force’s efforts can be found on the IOGCC Web site at 
http://iogcc.publishpath.com/ for a comprehensive report [5].
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